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Konstantin Ryabitsev has announced the release of version 0.16.0 of the b4 software-development tool. The biggest change is the addition of bug-tracking support:

The new "b4 bugs" command integrates with git-bug to let you track bug reports alongside your git repository. Bugs are stored as git objects inside the repo, so they travel with the code and can be shared via git push/pull without any external service.

There are also a lot of improvements to b4 review (which was covered here in March), better conflict resolution in b4 shazam, improved history rewriting, and more.

Jordan Rife's work involves writing BPF programs for Cilium that interface with Kubernetes networking. As part of that work, he wants to enable BPF programs with appropriate permissions to iterate through the sockets of a different network namespace. He led a session about the idea at the 2026 Linux Storage, Filesystem, Memory-Management, and BPF Summit where the BPF developers in attendance were quick to suggest a number of related alternatives.

Filesystem in Userspace (FUSE) maintainer Miklos Szeredi led a birds-of-a-feather (BoF) discussion about the subsystem at the 2026 Linux Storage, Filesystem, Memory Management, and BPF Summit. In it, he talked about maintenance challenges, proposed features and their status, and his plans for a new FUSE API. There is a lot of interest and activity in the FUSE community these days it seems.

Jynn Nelson describes the Rust language team's new LLM policy on the Inside Rust blog.

No one except the author is required to read LLM output unless they choose to: LLM output isn't allowed in public docs, PR descriptions, or Github comments unless it's clearly marked; reviewers aren't required to look at LLM PRs if they don't want to.

No one is required to use LLMs to contribute to rust-lang/rust: policies must be written first for humans, and only summarized for machines; LLM reviews cannot substitute for human review or self-review.

You are allowed to generate LLM content that only you see, without disclosure, as long as you do not post it anywhere that you expect us to read or review.

Security updates have been issued by AlmaLinux (fence-agents, gstreamer1-plugins-good, kernel, kernel-rt, p11-kit, perl-Archive-Tar, perl-DBI, and thunderbird), Debian (aom, botan3, and kernel), Fedora (abrt, coreutils, doctl, kernel, open62541, perl, perl-Devel-Cover, perl-PAR-Packer, and polymake), Mageia (acl and php), Oracle (firefox, frr, kernel, libreswan, nodejs-nodemon, nodejs22, perl-Archive-Tar, php:7.4, php:8.2, rsync, and thunderbird), Red Hat (compat-libtiff3, libpq, libtiff, postgresql, postgresql16, postgresql18, postgresql:12, postgresql:13, postgresql:15, postgresql:16, and postgresql:18), Slackware (stunnel), and SUSE (alloy, alsa, bind, chromedriver, corepack24, ffmpeg-4, golang-github-prometheus-prometheus, google-guest-agent, google-osconfig-agent, kubevirt, libgcrypt, libpng16, multipath-tools, netty, netty-tcnative, nodejs26, openssl-1_1, openssl-3, perl-HTTP-Tiny, perl-YAML-Syck, podman, python-sh, python-ujson, rsyslog, spice-vdagent, thrift, valkey, wpa_supplicant, and xen).

The AI Security Institute has released a detailed report on an security incident of its own making. The Institute set some LLM agents loose on the Internet with a security challenge; soon they were creating malware-laden pull requests and sock-puppet accounts to promote them.

The agent opened a malicious pull request (PR) to ⟨REPO_A⟩ and pursued a number of strategies to get it merged:

1. Repeatedly commented on the PR with sockpuppet accounts to manufacture consensus and pressure the maintainer into approving with minimal review.
2. Opened a GitHub Issue in another repository (also owned by ⟨PERSON_A⟩) containing a prompt injection for other coding agents. The malicious instructions were addressed to issue-triage AI coding agents and invisible to humans viewing the website.
3. Sent multiple emails to ⟨PERSON_A⟩ and ⟨PERSON_B⟩, with different pretexts to get them to run malicious code. Over the course of the sample, the agent sent five emails, some containing malware, others aimed at persuading a maintainer to accept the pull request.

It would be surprising if this were the only incident of this type; the only real difference here is that the people involved are documenting what happened.

The Fedora Council is considering a conflict-of-interest (COI) policy for its decision-making bodies, such as the Fedora Engineering Steering Committee (FESCo), special-interest groups (SIGs), and any other groups or individuals that report to the council and are responsible for decisions that impact the Fedora project. The current draft does not, however, apply to the council itself. The public discussion for the COI policy began on July 23 and seems to be nearing completion, with the council set to discuss the topic again during its meeting on August 13.

StepSecurity is reporting the emergence of a new worm affecting npm packages. The design of the worm is nothing new, but the rapidity with which it is exploiting captured npm packager credentials is noteworthy.

TL;DR: A self-propagating worm, which we are calling ChainDrop, is spreading rapidly through the npm ecosystem. So far 435 packages and more than 1,550 compromised versions have been flagged, starting with keyv@6.0.0. If you are using any of the packages listed below, assume your environment is compromised. We are still investigating the full scope; check back on this post for updates.

The recent discussion on "spawn templates" raised questions about whether it was time to provide an alternative to the classic Unix fork()/exec() pattern for process creation. One idea that was raised there was to shift the template pattern into an interface that could be used to efficiently assemble new processes from bare cloth, without duplicating the parent process. Preferably, that interface would be able to implement posix_spawn(). Li Chen, the author of the spawn-template work, has now responded with a patch series (written with significant LLM assistance) showing what a process-builder API for Linux might look like.

Security updates have been issued by AlmaLinux (frr, ldns, mingw-glib2, and perl-Archive-Tar), Debian (ruby2.7), Fedora (borgbackup, nebula, python-nh3, rust-ammonia, and seamonkey), Mageia (librabbitmq, libvncserver, packages, perl, perl-GD, perl-Unicode-LineBreak, squid, and unbound), Oracle (compat-libtiff3, frr, gstreamer1-plugins-good, javapackages-tools:201801, libreswan, nodejs:22, nodejs:24, p11-kit, perl-Archive-Tar, perl-DBI, php, pki-deps:10.6, and python-tornado), and SUSE (aws-iam-authenticator, bind, containerd, gawk, google-cloud-sap-agent, ignition, ImageMagick, java-11-openjdk, libpng16, libssh, mcphost, nginx, openssh, openssl-1_1, perl-DBI, perl-HTTP-Date, perl-Net-DNS, python-urwid, python3-dulwich, python312, python313, python3, python313-pydantic, python313-sentry-sdk, rrdtool, s390-tools, samba, spice-vdagent, vim, and xen).

John MacFarlane has published a lengthy retrospective to commemorate twenty years of the Pandoc document converter.

On August 3, 2006, I uploaded the first version of pandoc to my website, releasing it under the free GPL license. Pandoc 0.1 consisted of about 3000 lines of Haskell code, with no dependencies aside from GHC's standard library. It could convert Markdown, reStructuredText, HTML, and LaTeX documents into any of these formats, plus RTF or S5. I had no idea at the time that this would just be the first of over two hundred releases over the next twenty years; that the project would become the most popular program written in Haskell; that I would spend countless hours on bug-fixes, improvement, and project management; that I would collaborate with programmers in many other countries; that pandoc would come to support over fifty document formats; that it would allow automatic generation of citations and bibliographies; that it would become integrated into academic writing tools like Quarto and Jupyter Notebook; that it would be installed on millions of computers around the world.

How did this happen? I want to take advantage of pandoc's birthday to tell the story of the project, as best I can remember it.

For those of us with a long memory: John Goerzen has announced the release of C-Kermit 11, the first release of this file-transfer utility in 15 years.

As Debian maintainer of Kermit, I noticed some areas where it wasn't matching modern expectations. One area was, not surprising for a project of its age, security. Another area was that its character set or line-ending conversions are usually not desired now; we are used to byte-identical binary transfers, and the defaults caused confusion and even some rare instances of data corruption. So I started making a few patches last year.

See the changelog for details on the work that has been done.

Most of us probably haven't thought about C-Kermit in years (if ever), but there was a time when it was an essential tool for moving files between machines.

The Filesystem in Userspace (FUSE) subsystem provides a way to service filesystem requests from a user-space server, which moves the format-handling code out of the kernel. The FUSE server can use the io_uring facility for better performance, but Bernd Schubert is concerned that memory is being wasted because the current implementation has a single, large buffer size that is excessive for small I/O operations. He led a discussion on that topic in the filesystem track of the 2026 Linux Storage, Filesystem, Memory Management, and BPF Summit in Zagreb, Croatia.

The JFrog blog examines some reported vulnerabilities in SQLite, some of which made their way into high-profile vulnerability databases, that turned out to be entirely fabricated by LLMs.

These LLM slop CVEs can cause organizations to waste time investigating and patching vulnerabilities that do not actually exist, as well as polluting vulnerability databases. In environments where Critical vulnerabilities are automatically prioritized or tickets are opened based on vulnerability scores, such fabricated CVEs can turn into a real burden.

In environments where AI is used to automate vulnerability triage and remediation this becomes even more concerning. An AI agent that encounters a fabricated CVE may attempt to locate the vulnerable function, generate a patch, or recommend changes based on code that does not even exist. Instead of helping security teams remediate real vulnerabilities, it can lead them down a completely wrong path, potentially introducing unnecessary changes and wasting time.

Greg Kroah-Hartman has announced the release of the 7.1.6, 6.18.42, 6.12.101, and 6.6.148 stable kernels. Each contains hundreds of patches—the 7.1.6 kernel has more than 700—with fixes throughout the tree. Users are advised to upgrade.